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The United States Law of
Countervailing Duties and Federal
Agency Procurement After the Tokyo
Round: Is It "GATT Legal"?
Introduction
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' is the principal multilat-
eral treaty governing international trade. In its forty year history,
GATT-sponsored trade rounds2 have virtually eliminated the threat
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATr].
By convention, the treaty which opened for signature on October 30, 1947 is
referred to as the "General Agreement," while the institution which it and subse-
quent amendments, protocols, proces verbaux and other agreements created is referred
to as "the GATT." K. DAM, THE GATr 3, n. 1 (1970). Parties to the General Agree-
ment, when referred to individually, are designated "contracting parties"; when
referred to collectively, they are designated the "CoNRaArING PARTms." GATr,
supra, art. XXV, para. 1.
For historical background and detailed analysis of the provisions of the General
Agreement, see generally K. DAM, THE GArr, supra; J. JACKSON, WoRLD TRADE AND TE
LAW OF GAIT (1969) [hereinafter JAcKsoN];J.JACKsON, THE Wom.n TRADING SYS-
TEM (1989) [hereinafter WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; and J. JACKSON AND W. DAVEY,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
JACKSON & DAVEY].
The General Agreement became legally binding on the contracting parties under
the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 [here-
inafter Protocol of Provisional Application]. Under the terms of the Protocol, the
contracting parties agreed to "apply provisionally on and after I January 1948: (a)
Parts I and M of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and (b) Part H of that
Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." Id. Part I
of the General Agreement includes the basic unconditional most-favored-nation
("MFN") commitment concerning "customs duties and other charges" as well as the
tariff reduction schedules agreed upon at the 1947 Geneva conferences; Part II
includes most other substantive commitments related to the reduction of trade barri-
ers as well as a list of exceptions; Part III's provisions provide structure to the GAIT
system. See GATr, supra. For a discussion of the Protocol and its function, see JACK-
SON & DAVEY, supra, at 295; JACKSON, supra, at 60-62.
2. Multilateral conferences sponsored by the GAIT, at which members bargain
for trade concessions, are popularly known as "rounds." K. DAM, supra note 1, at 56.
The first six rounds focussed on tariff barriers to trade. The Tokyo Round (1973-79)
was the first to concentrate on nontariff barriers. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at
324-25. The Uruguay Round, which is scheduled to end in 1990, was announced by
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posed to the international economy by high tariffs on imported goods
and contributed substantially to the dramatic expansion in world trade
since the Second World War.3
The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations (1973-1979) was the first
GATT-sponsored trade round to focus primarily on curtailing nontariff
trade barriers. Also known as the "Multilateral Trade Negotiations",
the Tokyo Round produced a group of "codes" (or "MTN agreements")
which attempt to control such potential nontariff trade barriers as cus-
toms valuation procedures, government procurement regulations,
import licensing practices, technical specifications, subsidies and coun-
tervailing duties, and antidumping enforcement mechanisms. 4
In form and in legal effect, the Tokyo Round codes were negotiated
as "stand alone" treaties, rather than as amendments to the General
Agreement. 5 One reason the Tokyo Round negotiations were cast in
the form of independent treaties was that participating Western indus-
the Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round [hereinafter Uruguay Round],
Declaration of 20 September 1986, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARUFFS AND TRADE:
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 33 Supp. 19 (1986) [hereinafter
GATr, B.I.S.D.].
3. See C. AHo &J. ARONSON, TRADE TALKS 18-20 (1985); WORLD TRADING SYS-
TmM, supra note 1, at 52-53. By the dose of the Tokyo Round, average tariff rates had
been reduced to 4.7%. I
4. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, GATr, B.I.S.D., 26 Supp. 116 (1980); Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, done Apr. 11, 1979, 26 B.I.S.D. 26 Supp. 33
[hereinafter Government Procurement Code]; Agreement on Import Licensing Pro-
cedures, done Apr. 10, 1979, GATr, B.I.S.D., 26 Supp. 154 (1980); Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, done March 29, 1979, GATr, B.I.S.D., 26 Supp. 8 (1980);
Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, GATr, B.I.S.D., 26 Supp. 56 (1980)
[hereinafter Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code]; Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 9,
1979, GATr, B.I.S.D., 26 Supp. 171 (1980). See generally WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION 69, 101, 107, 109 (1986).
5. See SUBCOMMrrrEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., MTN STUDIEs, 8 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter
MTN STUDIES].
Countries which are not signatories to the General Agreement may theoretically
accede to the MTN Agreements. For example, article 19 of the Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures Code provides that the Code is open for acceptance to con-
tracting parties, parties which have provisionally acceded to the GATT, and to "any
other government on terms, related to the effective application of rights and obliga-
tions under this Agreement, to be agreed between that government and the signato-
ries.. . ." Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code, supra note 4, art. 19, para.
2(c).
Furthermore, the language of the codes which establishes rights and obligations
purports to apply only to other code signatories. See, e.g., Government Procurement
Code, supra note 4, art. II, para. 1; and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code,
supra note 4, Art. 1.
After the MTN Agreements were drafted, GATT members who declined to partici-
pate were concerned about the impact of the codes on their rights under the General
Agreement. In an official "decision," the Contracting Parties declared that "existing
rights and benefits under the GATT of contracting parties not being parties to these
Agreements, including those derived from Article I, are not affected by these Agree-
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trialized countries feared they could not obtain sufficient support from
developing country signatories for amendments to the General Agree-
ment which address nontariff trade barriers. 6 Another reason for the
Tokyo Round's "stand alone" treaties approach was the desire of the
American Congress to guarantee reciprocity. Congress thought a sys-
tem of separate treaties would encourage greater participation by the
major trading nations of the world in the MTN Agreements and prevent
"free riders" from securing the benefits of the negotiations without
undertaking domestic economic reform. 7 Although reciprocity was also
an issue during the previous trade rounds directed at tariff reductions,8
Congress apparently felt that the special characteristics of nontariff bar-
riers demanded a new negotiating strategy.9 Departing from a fifty year
ments." Action by the Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Decision of 28 November 1979 (1/4905), GATr, B.I.S.D., 26 Supp. 201 (1980).
6. See MTN STUDIES, supra note 5, at 6-7.
Article XXX of the General Agreement provides for amendments. Amendments to
Part I of the General Agreement (which includes the unconditional MFN obligation
that applies to customs duties) require unanimous acceptance of the parties. Amend-
ments to other parts of the General Agreement require two-thirds acceptance by the
contracting parties; however, such amendments are only effective between parties
which accept them. GATr, supra note 1, art. XXX, para. 1. See MTN STUDIES, supra
note 5, at 6-7. Since the majority of contracting parties are developing countries,
most of which employ nontariff protectionist measures to encourage industrial
growth, it appeared there would be insufficient support for amendments to the Gen-
eral Agreement that attempted to limit such measures. Id,
7. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 77-78 (1974) [hereinafter
REPORT ON TRADE ACT OF 1974]. The Trade Act of 1974 authorized the President to
participate in the Tokyo Round. Trade Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978,
§ 101(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2111(a) (1975) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974]. See also Trade
Agreement Authority, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 72:0101 (Sept. 28, 1988). Writing
about section 126 of the Act, which authorized the President to suspend the benefits
of applicable trade legislation when a "major industrial country has not made conces-
sions under trade agreements entered into under this Act," the Committee
commented:
The Committee feels that the "unconditional" most-favored-nation principle
has led, in the past, to one-sided agreements .... Under this principle there
is an inherent incentive for countries to "get a free ride", since they would
automatically receive the benefits of any trade agreement .... No industrial-
ized country should be given a free ride in this negotiation. Nor should any
industrialized country provide protection to its industries while expecting
others to lower barriers for their exports .... The United States should not
grant concessions to countries which are not willing to offer substantial
equivalent competitive opportunities for the products of the United States in
their market as we offer their products in our market.
REPORT ON TRADE ACr OF 1974, supra, at 94-95.
8. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 241-45.
9. As one commentator explained,
Fundamentally, the reason for this shift toward conditional MFN lies in the
nature of the codes themselves. The codes are designed to deal with
nontariff barriers-not with tariffs. Nontariffbarriers... are difficult to con-
trol. Unlike tariffs, they are not always visible. They often involve "internal"
national policies. Such policies often have a substantial effect on trade; but
their asserted objective is unrelated to trade .... In order to reduce or
eliminate such NTBs nations must submit to cooperative discipline in regula-
tion of their own affairs. From the outset, it was dear that not all GATT
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history of negotiating exclusively unconditional most-favored-nation
("MFN") trade agreements,' 0 the Trade Act of 1974 authorized the
Executive Branch to negotiate agreements which would condition
receipt of any related benefits upon satisfactory acceptance of the agree-
ment's substantive obligations."
This Note examines whether the U.S. can limit extending privileges
created by two of the Tokyo Round codes, the Government Procure-
ment Code and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code, to
code signatories (and GATT members assuming substantially equivalent
obligations) without violating its unconditional most-favored-nation
commitment under article I of the General Agreement.' 2 This Note
contends that the unconditional MFN commitment of article I encom-
passes the method for levying countervailing duties13 as well as govern-
ment procurement practices, 14 and that no exemption is available to the
members were prepared to either negotiate or agree to international exami-
nation of their conduct in these respects. In these circumstances ... the
conditional form of MFN was inevitable.
Rubin, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Quiet
Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 221, 236 (1980).
10. United States policy favored the negotiation of bilateral commercial treaties
on an unconditional MFN basis beginning in 1922. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 250.
11. Section 102(f) of the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 7, provides,
[t]o insure that a foreign country or instrumentality which receives benefits
under a trade agreement entered into under this section is subject to the
obligations imposed by such agreement, the President may recommend to
Congress in the implementing bill ... that the benefits and obligations of
such agreement apply solely to the parties to such agreement, if such applica-
tion is consistent with the terms of the agreement.
12. The term "privilege" is used in the sense that after the Tokyo Round, the
U.S. reduced certain nontariff barriers only with respect to goods originating in code
signatories or, in limited circumstances, other GATT signatories. The U.S. law con-
cerning articles originating in countries not designated for favorable treatment by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was virtually unaffected by the Act.
The most comprehensive examination of the topic addressed by this Note is Huf-
bauer, Erb, and Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Princi-
p/e, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59 (1980) [hereinafter Hufbauer] (Dr. Hufbauer was
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Trade and Investment
Policy and apparently had a role in the readoption by the U.S. of the conditional
MFN trade agreement strategy). See also Rubin, supra note 9; G. Hufbauer, Should
Unconditional MFN Be Revived, Retired, or Recast?, in IssuEs IN WORLD TRADE Poumc-
GATT AT THE CROSSROADS 32 (R. H. Snape ed. 1986); WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 1, at 143-45; R. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
81-90 (1987) [hereinafter DEVELOPING COUNTRIES]; R. Hudec, Tiger, Tiger in the House:
A Critical Appraisal of the Case against Discriminatoy Trade Measures, in THE NEW GAIT
RouND OF Mu TImATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 165 (Petersmann & Hilf eds. 1988)
[hereinafter Hudec]; Snape, Is Non-discrimination Really Dead?, 11 WORLD ECON. I
(1988).
While the U.S. also adopted a conditional interpretation with respect to the code
on Technical Standards, this Note focuses on the Government Procurement Code
and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code because they generated the
most controversy. See Snape, Is Non-Discrimination Really Dead?, supra; and WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 143-44.
13. See infra notes 130-60 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 161-97 and accompanying text.
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U.S.; 15 therefore, American practices with respect to both codes violate
its obligations under the General Agreement, and injured parties may be
entitled to appropriate remedies.' 6 Thus, many outstanding counter-
vailing duty orders may be challenged at the GATT level.' 7 Similarly,
the fact that federal agencies are now forbidden from procuring supplies
covered by the Government Procurement Code from many GATT sig-
natories which are non-parties to the Code is also subject to challenge.' 8
This Note's analysis may also provide insights to the interpretation
of the results of the ongoing Uruguay Round of trade negotiations,
scheduled to end in 1990. The Uruguay Round may produce nontariff
trade barrier agreements which resemble the MTN agreements in struc-
ture.19 Since Congress required the President to recommend that any
such agreements be applied by the U.S. on a conditional most-favored-
nation basis "if such application is consistent with the terms of such
agreement[s]", 20 an analysis similar to that presented in this Note may
15. For example, one such exemption might be found in the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application, which "grandfathers" domestic legislation existing as of October
30, 1947. See supra note 1; JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 300.
16. See infra notes 122 and accompanying text.
This Note does not explore the ramifications of these conclusions for parties seek-
ing relief under U.S. domestic law. See generally Jackson, The General Agreement on Tar-
is and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 283 (1967); J.
Jackson, United States Law and the'Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, in IMPLE-
MENTING THE TOKYO ROUND (J. Jackson, J. Louis, & M. Matsushita eds. 1984).
17. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
The International Trade Administration reported as of December 1, 1989, 77 out-
standing countervailing duty orders, many of which involved exporting countries not
entitled to the injury test. These countries include Argentina (8 orders outstanding),
New Zealand (5), Peru (5), Thailand (6), Ecuador (1), Malaysia (1), Singapore (1),
South Africa (1), Turkey (2), Zimbabwe (1), and possibly Mexico (12) and Brazil (7)
(both countries only recently obtained from the U.S. the right to the injury test).
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, IMPORT ADMIN-
ISTRATION, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
ORDERS, FINDINGS, AND SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT, ( Dec. 1,
1989).
18. The regulations which accompany the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 forbid
54 federal agencies from acquiring foreign products from suppliers located in coun-
tries which are neither a "designated country" (generally, countries which acceded to
the Government Procurement Code) nor a "Caribbean Basin country." Federal
Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 25A01, 25A02(c), 25A06 (1988) [hereinafter
Acquisition Regulation]. These regulations effectively blacldist 56 of the 99 con-
tracting parties. The affected countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile,
Egypt, Greece, India, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and 38 other GATT members. Id.
Compare Acquisition Regulation, supra, with 40 USITC, OPERATIONS OF TRADE AGREE-
MENTS PROGRAM REP. 38 (1989).
19. See Uruguay Round, supra note 2. The Declaration noted, "[n]egotiations
shall aim to reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures, including quantitative restric-
tions." Id. at 23. Other topics on the agenda include tariff reductions, liberalization
in the trade of tropical and natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing,
agriculture, GATT safeguard provisions, the functioning of the Tokyo Round Codes,
dispute settlement, protection of intellectual property (including counterfeit goods),
and trade-related investment measures. Id. at 23-24.
20. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 provides:
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lead to the conclusion that U.S. legislation related to these forthcoming
codes is not "GATr legal." 2 1
I. Background
A. The Objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and the Unconditional Most Favored Nation Principle
The Preamble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade sets forth
its guiding principles, which include the encouragement of free interna-
tional trade, the lowering of trade barriers through multilateral trade
negotiations conducted on a reciprocal basis, and the elimination of dis-
criminatory trade practices. 22
1. The Encouragement of Free Trade
The drafters of the General Agreement assumed that a laissez-faire
theory of international trade would best promote an efficient allocation
of the world's scarce resources.23 Laissez-faire trade theory suggests
that a nation's exports will depend on the nature of that nation's "com-
[tbo ensure that a foreign country which receives benefits under a trade
agreement entered into... [under the authority of this Act] is subject to the
obligations imposed by such agreement, the President shall recommend to
Congress ... that the benefits and obligations of such agreement shall apply
solely to the parties of such agreement, if such application is consistent with
the terms of the agreement. The President may also recommend with respect
to any such agreement that the benefits and obligations of such agreement
not apply uniformly to all parties to such agreement, if such application is
consistent with the terms of such agreement.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
§ 1103(a)(3), 19 U.S.C.A. 2903(a)(3) (p.p. 1990).
21. In a commentary on the forthcoming agreement concerning international
trade in services, but apparently alluding to all of the Uruguay Round agreements,
one American participant in the Uruguay Round negotiating process argued that:
only the parties to an agreement to do away with trade restrictions should be
able to claim its benefits, which is normal, fair, and sensible international
practice .... Among those who do participate in the process by adhering to
a sectoral agreement, there should be provision for unconditional most-
favored-nation treatment, limited to the subject matter of that agreement.
J. Reinstein, Services in the Uruguay Round: The US Viewpoint, in LAw AND PRACTICE
UNDER THE GATT § IV.A.4, at 17-18 (1988).
22. The Preamble declares that:
[The Contracting Parties] ... Recognizing that their relations in the field of
trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily grow-
ing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of
the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into recipro-
cal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of dis-
criminatory treatment in international commerce ....
GATr, supra note 1, Preamble.
23. See K. D~m, supra note 1, at 12; GArr, supra note 1, Preamble. For contrary
views, see WoRLD TRADING SysTEM, supra note 1, at 14-17.
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parative advantage."' 24 A country has a comparative advantage relative
to other nations if it is a more efficient producer of specific goods and
services, usually resulting from a greater endowment of the applicable
factors of production. 25 Nations export goods which they can more effi-
ciently produce and import goods for which their trading partners pos-
sess comparative advantages. The laissez-faire approach to
international trade enables the world economy to realize economies of
scale; it also leads to improved product quality by subjecting producers
to more competition. In light of these benefits, one of the principal
objectives of the drafters of the General Agreement was the removal of
as many barriers to international trade as politically feasible.26
2. Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations
The General Agreement also assures signatories that trade negotiations
leading to a reduction in tariffs or other trade barriers will be conducted
on a reciprocal, mutually advantageous basis. 27 No contracting party is
expected to make trade concessions without receiving the benefits of
similar concessions from other parties. The commitment to reciprocity
recognizes that domestic legislators are more willing to reduce trade
barriers (which reduction may cause such an increase in imports that it
damages domestic producers) if domestic exporting companies obtain
new markets as a result of reciprocal reductions in other countries' trade
barriers.28
3. Nondiscrimination and the Most Favored Nation Prnciple
a. The Role of Trade Nondiscrimination in Promoting International
Comity and Economic Efficiency
In addition to the encouragement of free trade through multilateral
reciprocal reductions in trade barriers, the General Agreement seeks to
promote international comity by adopting the "nondiscrimination prin-
ciple."129 The nondiscrimination principle requires domestic laws which
affect international trade to treat goods imported from GATT signato-
ries equally.
Recent historical experience with discriminatory trade practices
inspired the drafters of the General Agreement to include a firm com-
mitment to nondiscrimination. After Congress passed the infamous
24. Bergsten & Cline, Trade Policy in the 1980's: An Overview, in TRADE POuCY IN
THE 1980s 59, 60-61 (W. Cline ed. 1983).
25. A nation's "factors of production" include: (1) human capital (the work force
and "investments" made in education to develop technical skills), (2) real capital
(savings), and (3) natural endowments such as minerals, farmland, a favorable di-
mate, etc. See generally D. SNIDER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 19-92
(7th ed. 1979).
26. See GATr, supra note 1, Preamble; supra note 22.
27. See GATr, supra note 1, Preamble; supra note 22.
28. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 24.
29. GATr, supra note 1, Preamble.
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Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,30 countries responded with a variety
of "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies which contributed immensely to
the ensuing contraction in world trade.3 1 At the first session of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council of the United Nations, which took place in
1946 in London, the U.S. proposed a resolution calling for the convoca-
tion of an international conference on trade and employment.3 2 The
resolution declared that "[e]ffective action in regard to... trade barriers
and discriminations must ... be taken, or the whole programme of
international economic cooperation will fail, and an economic environ-
ment conducive to the maintenance of peaceful international relations
will not be created."3 3 In support of the resolution, the American dele-
gate summarized thirty years of history:
There is no need to dwell upon the disastrous consequences of Allied
disunity following 11 November 1918; but because of the subject-matter
that is before us it might be well to remember that blindly nationalistic
and selfish trade policies eventually retarded all free exchange of goods
across frontiers. This situation was intensified because migration from
one country to another was practically stopped. These external factors, in
combination with internal economic dislocation and unemployment in
many countries, forced Governments to experiments that were frequently
not profitable and also brought into control minorities that took on dicta-
torial powers. The world laboratory of that time taught even a casual
observer that economic distress is followed by political disturbances and
that both destroy security. 3 4
The U.S. apparently believed that a variety of economic policy blunders,
including discriminatory trade practices, exacerbated the Depression
and promoted the rise of European Fascism, and that a strong multilat-
eral commitment to nondiscriminatory trade practices would help pre-
vent similar disturbances in the future.
In addition to fostering international political harmony, the nondis-
crimination principle also promotes economic efficiency. Since the non-
discrimination principle prohibits a GATT member from imposing
punitive tariffs against another member, all imported goods originating
from GATT members are subject to the same tariff. Therefore, any
price differences to consumers in the importing country will reflect
solely the comparative advantages possessed by the respective exporting
30. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590(1930). The Act raised average tariffs to 52.8% ad valorem, and was enacted notwith-
standing formal protests from 59 countries and warnings received from over 1000
economists. Pastor, The Cty-and-Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy, in MAKING
ECONOMIC POLICY IN CoNoRss 158, 161-62 (A. Schick ed. 1983).
31. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 27, 351. At least 8 countries raised their tariffs in
response to the Smoot-Hawley protectionist initiative, including Canada, France,
Mexico, Italy, Spain, Cuba, Australia, and New Zealand. Pastor, supra note 30, at 162.
32. See I U.N. ESCOR Annex la, U.N. Doc. E/4 (1946) [hereinafater U.N. Reso-
lution]. The conference called for by the U.S. laid the foundation for the negotiation
of the General Agreement. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 41-49.
33. U.N. Resolution, supra note 32, at para. 3.
34. Id. at 64.
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countries; high-cost exporting countries will not be able to obtain spe-
cial advantages for their products in importing countries through the
negotiation of tariff concessions which apply only to goods originating
in the exporter's market. High-cost producers must either improve effi-
ciency or reallocate resources to the production of products for which
they possess a comparative advantage. Thus, the nondiscrimination
principle encourages a more efficient world economy.3 5
b. Unconditional and Conditional Most Favored Nation Clauses and
Nondiscriminatory Trade
To further the goal of nondiscriminatory trade, as well as to ensure reci-
procity and promote reductions in trade barriers, the negotiators of the
General Agreement borrowed from a long history of use in bilateral
trade agreements the "unconditional most favored nation clause." 3 6 An
unconditional MFN clause obligates the promisor country to extend to
the promisee country the benefit of any tariff concession made by the
promisor to a third party, without any reciprocal trade concession from
the promisee country other than the same general promise by the prom-
isee to the promisor.3 7 As applied in the multilateral context of GATT,
unconditional MFN requires that a party, to the General Agreement
which offers any country a special reduced tariff must extend the new
tariff to all members of the GATT, without demanding any special con-
cession from them in return.3 8
Historically, unconditional MFN obligations were carefully distin-
35. See WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 134-35.
36. See generaUy JACKSON, supra note 1, at 249-72; JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1,
at 428; WoRu.D TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 133-48. An early form of the uncon-
ditional most favored nation (MFN) principle has been traced as far back as 1417, but
its modern usage began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The U.S. began
to negotiate trade agreements on an exclusively unconditional MFN basis in 1922.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 250. Pursuant to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934, P.L. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943, the U.S. negotiated and accepted 32 bilateral trade
agreements on an unconditional MFN basis between 1934 and 1945. Id.
37. WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 136.
The principal unconditional MFN commitment in the General Agreement is found
in article I. It provides:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method
of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formali-
ties in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all
matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of article III [see infra notes 167-69
and accompanying text] any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties.
GAIT, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1.
38. GATr, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1.
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guished from conditional MFN commitments,"9 and American bilateral
trade agreements negotiated before 1922 frequently included condi-
tional MFN clauses.40 Under conditional MFN clauses, the parties offer
each other the opportunity to obtain the benefits of subsequent trade
concessions made to third countries, but only in exchange for reciprocal
trade concessions. 4 1
In practice, the renegotiation of tariffs pursuant to conditional MFN
dauses proved very difficult. In the opinion of one commentator, condi-
tional MFN clauses resulted in "more diplomatic controversy, more vari-
ations in construction, more international ill-feeling, more conflict
between international obligations and municipal law and between judi-
cial interpretation and executive practice, more confusion and uncer-
tainty of operation, than have developed under all the unconditional-
most-favored-nation pledges of all countries combined."'4 2
c. Policies Supporting the Use of Unconditional MFN Clauses in
GATT.
The unconditional MFN obligation has been characterized as "the cor-
nerstone of the international trade rules embodied in the [GATr]." '43
During the 1947 GATr drafting sessions, the U.S. took the position that
a firm commitment to unconditional MFN obligation in any forthcoming
treaty was "absolutely fundamental." 44 The unconditional MFN obliga-
tion is important to the GATT system because it advances each of the
fundamental objectives of the General Agreement: it optimizes world
economic resources by encouraging free international trade, it helps
lower trade barriers through multilateral trade negotiations conducted
on a reciprocal basis, and it eliminates national trade practices which
purposefully discriminate against particular nations.
The mechanical operation of the unconditional MFN obligation
implicitly promotes nondiscriminatory trade. With respect to tariff bar-
riers to trade, unconditional MFN establishes for each signatory a single
set of rates for "customs duties and charges of any kind" applicable to
39. See, e.g., Minerva Automobiles v. U.S., 96 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1938); John T.
Bill Co. v. U.S., 104 F.2d 67 (C.C.P.A. 1939); Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. U.S., 136
F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
40. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 250.
41. For example, if country A lowers it tariffs on goods from country B, A's other
conditionally committed countries may receive the benefit of the lower tariff, but only
if they offer a satisfactory package of new concessions to country A in return. See
WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 137.
42. Viner, The Most Favored Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties, 32 J. POL.
ECON. 101, 111 (1924). As an historical example, when France followed a conditional
MFN trade policy between 1919-1927, other countries simply refused to negotiate
tariff concessions with it. Hudec, supra note 12, at 191.
43. SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SENATE COM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG.,
2D. SESS., ExEcurvE BRANCH GAIT STUDIES, No. 9, THE MOST-FAvoRED NATION
PROVISION 133 (Compilation of 1973 Studies Prepared by the Executive Branch:
Comm. Print 1974) (hereinafter TARIFF COMMISSION REPORT); JACKSON & DAVEY,
supra note 1, at 428.
44. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 252.
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all GAIT members,45 effectively prohibiting GAT members from
politicizing trade through 'discriminatory tariff policies. Similarly,
imposing an unconditional MFN obligation on the raising of nontariff
trade barriers prevents GATT signatories from using them as a subtle
means of discriminating against goods originating in disfavored
signatories.
An unconditional MFN clause also promotes free trade by
extending the scope of tariff reductions. Parties which assume the obli-
gations of the General Agreement must reduce tariffs to the lowest level
they offer any country, whether or not a member. As the number of
GATT signatories has increased from approximately two dozen in 1948
to almost one hundred today, the unconditional MFN clause has dramat-
ically lowered average tariff levels and reduced the adverse impact of
tariff trade barriers on the world economy.46
The unconditional MFN obligation in GATT also ensures reciproc-
ity in multilateral trade negotiations, since all parties to the General
Agreement exchange commitments to unconditional MFN. A major
benefit of unconditional MFN with regard to reciprocity is that it pre-
serves for the future the balance of trade concessions reached at a par-
ticular trade round.47 Trade negotiations are based in part on the status
quo relationship between tariffs imposed by the participating countries
on key products and the trade flows which result from this relationship.
If, after a trade round, a few members extended each other a special low
tariff on selected products, it would upset the relationship between tar-
iffs charged on those products by countries participating in the trade
negotiation and the rates charged by members who subsequently decide
to offer each other reduced rates. This shift in relative tariff levels could
dramatically alter the international market for those products and dis-
rupt the assumptions about future trade flows upon which participants
relied during the trade round. As explained by the U.S. during the 1947
Geneva Conferences, unconditional MFN was "necessary [not only to]
safeguard tariff concessions which we negotiate on particular items, but
also to provide a part of the general quid pro quo for any normal trade
agreement .... ,,48
d. The General Agreement's Exceptions to Unconditional MFN
The General Agreement includes a sophisticated system of reservations,
waivers, and escape clauses from its obligations, including the uncondi-
tional MFN obligation. Although the exception provisions are often
inconsistent with the basic GATT mission of promoting free, nondis-
criminatory trade, they were considered politically necessary to ensure
maximum overall acceptance of GAT[ obligations by the major trading
45. See GArr, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1, reproduced in supra note 37.
46. Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 38-39.
47. See id. at 37-38.
48. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 252.
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nations.4 9 For purposes of issues addressed in this Note, the most
important reservation from the obligations of the General Agreement
may be found in the Protocol of Provisional Application, which subjects
the acceptance of Part II obligations to existing domestic legislation.50
Another source of exceptions to the obligations of the General
Agreement has been the formation of regional trade blocks which func-
tion as institutions outside the official GATT framework. These
arrangements often include the exchange of tariff concessions by partici-
pants which are not offered to the general GATT membership and
therefore derogate from unconditional MFN. Examples of such
arrangements include the European Economic Community51 and the
Canadian-U.S. automotive parts agreement. 52 The amendments to the
General Agreement which provide developing countries with the "Gen-
eralized System of Preferences" also derogate from the scope of the
unconditional MFN obligation.53 While all of these arrangements may
curtail the applicability of unconditional MFN, they are nevertheless
"GATT-legal." The European Economic Community is regarded as a
customs union, an exception to unconditional MFN sanctioned by article
XXIV of the General Agreement. 54 Although the Canadian-U.S. auto-
motive agreement arguably violated the General Agreement, the U.S.
obtained a waiver from the GATT.5 5 Finally, the Generalized System of
Preferences required long debate and substantial amendments to the
1947 General Agreement. 5 6 The efforts of the involved parties to
ensure that these arrangements were "GAIT legal" contrasts markedly
with the actions of the U.S. Congress in enacting the Tokyo Round Gov-
ernment Procurement Code and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Code on a conditional MFN basis, without detailed consideration of
49. See generally idt at 553-73.
50. See supra note 1. Other exceptions to GATT obligations include article XXV
(confers general waiver power "[i]n exceptional circumstances not elsewhere pro-
vided for in [the] . . . Agreement," subject to the approval of the remaining con-
tracting parties), article XIX (permits emergency action where particular obligations
result in "unforeseen developments... [which] cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products"; such
action includes the suspension, withdrawal or modification of the obligation), and
article XX (lists "general" waivers from GATT obligations, including measures to
protect public morals and the health of human, animal or plant life, measures to
restrict the movement of precious metals, products of prison labor, and measures
which protect national treasures of artistic, historic, or archeological value). See Pro-
tocol of Provisional Application, supra note 1.
51. SeeJACKSON & DAvEY, supra note 1, at 199-223.
52. United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement, doneJan. 16, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 467-75.
53. See GATr, supra note 1, at part IV, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII; JACKSON, supra note
1, at 625-72.
54. GArr, supra note 1, art. XXIV; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 586-92.
55. United States-Imports of Automotive Products, in GArr, B.I.S.D., 14th Supp. 37
(1966) (decision of Dec. 20, 1965). See also Id., 13th Supp. 112 (1965); id., 14th Supp.
181 (1966) (working party reports).
56. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 1140 ff.
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whether such an approach was consistent with its obligations under arti-
cle 1.
B. The Obligations of the General Agreement Related to
Countervailing Duties and Government Procurement
Practices, U.S. Domestic Law, and the Tokyo Round
Codes
1. The GATT System and the Control of Nontariff Trade Barriers
The General Agreement includes complex provisions which attempt to
limit nontariff barriers to trade. Subjects addressed by these provisions
include internal taxes and regulations which discriminate against
imported goods, 57 onerous customs procedures, 58 import quotas, 59
exchange rate policies designed to promote exports,60 subsidies and
countervailing duties, 6 1 and state trading enterprises. 6 2 The following
sections describe the dilemma presented to the GATT system by two
groups of nontariff trade barriers: countervailing duties and govern-
ment procurement practices.
2. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
Subsidies are direct or indirect government payments to local producers
which, at least in theory, reduce the selling prices of affected goods.
Subsidy programs may attempt to encourage regional development,
facilitate research in areas deemed too risky by private interests, pro-
mote exports, or support the incomes of "socially deserving" groups
such as farmers. 63 Any subsidy, whatever its objective, can affect trade
flows.
a. Controlling Subsidies: The General Agreement and
Countervailing Duties
The General Agreement provides only limited restraints on subsidy
practices because many contracting parties consider subsidy programs
vitally important to their internal economic development. 64 For exam-
ple, article XVI urges contracting parties to "avoid" the use of export
57. GATr, supra note 1, art. III.
58. ld, art. VII-X.
59. ML, art. XI.
60. i, art. XV.
61. Id., art. XVI.
62. IM, art. XVII.
63. Baldwin, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND FINANCE 231, 233 (Baldwin & Richardson eds., 2d ed. 1981). Professor
Jackson has commented that,
almost anything that assists a business could be termed a subsidy, including
government financed employee welfare (such as social security schemes),
which might enable a firm to pay its labor less, or excellent education facili-
ties that provide skilled people to the firm, or even fire and police protection
that gives security to the firm and lowers its insurance costs.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 366.
64. See generally JACKSON, supra note 1, at 365-400.
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subsidies6 5 for primary products6 6 and to eliminate other export subsi-
dies as soon as "practicable." '67 If export subsidies on manufactured
goods reduce the prices for the goods in the importing country below
those charged domestically, article XVI requires the elimination of such
subsidies from "the earliest practicable date."'68 With respect to other
than export subsidies, the General Agreement requires subsidizing
members to notify the CONTRACTING PARTMES of the nature of the subsi-
dies and to "discuss with the ... [affected] contracting party or parties
concerned the possibility of eliminating or reducing them."'69 A U.S.
Senate report relating to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 complained
that "this rule, in practice, has proved as toothless as might be surmised
from its terms."'70
The General Agreement permits contracting parties to defend
domestic producers from subsidized imports by imposing countervailing
duties.7 1 The purpose of a countervailing duty, which is generally equal
to the estimated value of the subsidy, is to neutralize the adverse effect
of the subsidy on the competing domestic industry by raising the price
of the subsidized imports by the amount of the subsidy.
A provision in article VI of the General Agreement restricts the
right to impose a countervailing duty to circumstances in which the sub-
sidy "causes" or "threatens" "material injury" to an established domes-
tic industry, or "materially retards" the establishment of a domestic
industry. 72 This proof of injury test recognizes that a contracting party
65. Export subsidies are typically designed to help the balance of payments posi-
tion of a country and to encourage "export-led" economic growth of the domestic
economy. They can appear under many guises, induding direct payments to produ-
cers contingent on export performance, lower domestic freight charges for export
goods, special prices to exporters on products or services provided by government-
controlled entities, or export credits at below market rates. See Hufbauer, supra note
12, at 43-44; GAIT Annex: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, GArr, B.I.S.D., 26th
Supp. 80-81 (1978-79).
66. See GATr, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 3. However, "if any form of subsidy...
operates to increase the export of any primary product ... such subsidy shall not be
applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equi-
table share of world export trade in that product," taking into account the traditional
shares of world trade in that product and other "special factors." Id
A primary product is defined as "any product of farm, forest or fishery or any min-
eral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade." Id.,
Annex I, at art. XVI, § B, para. 2.
67. IdL, art. XVI, para. 4.
68. Id
69. Id, art. XVI, para. 1. Parties are reluctant to comply with the notification
provision because of the sensitive nature of the information it requires them to dis-
dose; in the hands of another party, such information could be extremely valuable
during a countervailing duty proceeding. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 388.
70. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1979).
71. GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, para. 3. A countervailing duty is defined in the
General Agreement as "a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty
or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or
export of any merchandise." Id.
72. Id., art. VI, para. 6(a).
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could impose frequent countervailing duties as a form of disguised pro-
tection of domestic industry; domestic producers who are politically
powerful and adversely affected by competitively priced imports can be
very persuasive in finding alleged subsidies and demanding relief.73
b. The Pre-Tokyo Round U.S. Law of Countervailing Duties
The U.S. may impose countervailing duties without proving injury to
domestic industry, as required by article VI of the General Agreement.
This exemption arises because the provisions concerning subsidies and
countervailing measures fall within Part II of the General Agreement
and are therefore subject to the "grandfather clause" included in the
Protocol of Provisional Application. 74 Since the American counter-
vailing duty statute of 1897 did not require such an injury test,7 5 the
U.S. was not obliged to apply the test to goods originating in other
GATT signatories upon its becoming a party to the General Agreement.
c. The Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code,
and the Post-Tokyo Round U.S. Countervailing Duty Law
During the drafting of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code,
a principal negotiating objective of the contracting parties was to con-
vince the U.S. to modify its countervailing duty law to include the injury
test requirement of article VI of the General Agreement. 76 The U.S.
73. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 402.
74. See GArr, supra note 1, art. VI; Protocol of Provisional Application, supra note
1.
75. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897). For an excellent
history of the U.S. countervailing duty law and the impact of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, see Cementos Anahuac Del Golfo, SA. v. U.S., 689 F. Supp. 1191, 1200-
05 (CT. INT'L TRADE 1988), and Cementos Guadalajara v. U.S., 686 F. Supp. 335,
342-47 (CT. INT'L TRADE 1988).
The old law imposed a countervailing duty only when the imported goods were
already subject to a customs duty. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1982); Cementos Anauhuac,
589 F. Supp. at 1201. The Trade Act of 1974, supra note 7, modified the U.S. coun-
tervailing duty law to permit the imposition of countervailing duties even when the
goods were otherwise duty free. This expansion of the scope of the countervailing
duty law would violate article VI of the General Agreement if it did not provide for an
injury test. It also could not be saved by a Protocol defense because the grandfather
clause applies only to legislation existing as of October 30, 1947. Therefore, the new
U.S. law required proof of injury to domestic manufacturers as a condition precedent
to the imposition of a countervailing duty on otherwise duty free goods, if "a deter-
mination of injury is required by the international obligations of the United States."
19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982); Cementos Anauhuac, 689 F. Supp. at 1201-2.
In Cementos Guadalajara, 686 F. Supp. at 348-52, defendant cement exporter argued
that its shipments of cement to the U.S. could not be subject to a countervailing duty
without a proof of injury to U.S. industry because Mexico acceded to the GATT. The
court rejected this argument because Mexico's accession became effective after the
cement arrived in the U.S., and "the liability for duties is established at the time of
the entry of the goods into the U.S.." Id at 351.
76. See generally Barcel6, The Two-Track Subsidies Code-Countervailing Duties and Trade
Retaliation, in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFrER THE TOKYO RouND 121 (Quinn & Slayton
eds. 1982); G. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION
117-18 (1986).
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agreed to make concessions in this area, but demanded in return that
contracting parties curtail their subsidy practices in the manner later
reflected in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code. 7 7
Under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,78 sub-
sidies on goods that originate in countries which (1) are signatories to
the code,79 (2) have assumed comparable obligations," ° or (3) are non-
signatories to the GATT but have bilateral trade agreements with the
U.S. requiring unconditional MFN treatment8 l must cause or threaten
material injury to U.S. industry (or "materially retard" the establishment
77. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code, supra note 4, requires its
signatories to eliminate export subsidies on manufactured goods and minerals,
regardless of whether the export subsidy results in export prices lower than domestic
prices. Id at art. 9, para. 1 (The General Agreement prohibited only those export
subsidies on manufactured goods "which ... result in the sale of such product for
export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to
buyers in the domestic market." GATr, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 4). The Code
also requires signatories to participate in special government-to-government dispute
resolution procedures w hen a signatory's industry is adversely affected by any form
of subsidy granted by another signatory to domestic producers. Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures Code, supra note 4, art. 12, 13, 17-19. See BARCEL6, supra note
76, at 122, 137-43.
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code, supra note 4, art. 19, para. 9, permits
a code signatory to refuse recognition of another signatory's accession to the code.
A Senate report noted that the U.S. had long sought to impose greater discipline
over subsidy practices than found in the General Agreement. The report character-
ized subsidies as one of "the most pernicious practices which distort trade to the
disadvantage of United States commerce." S. RzP. No. 249, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 37,
40 (1979).
78. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)
(codified throughout 19 U.S.C.) authorized the Executive Branch to sign the Tokyo
Round codes on behalf of the U.S., 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b), and modified American law
to bring it into conformity with obligations set forth in the codes. 19 U.S.C. § 1671-
1671(e) (modified U.S. countervailing duty law for goods originating in signatories to
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code); 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (a) (authorized
President to waive discriminatory government procurement practices for goods
originating in signatories of the Government Procurement Code).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(1) (1982); 19 U.S.C.
§ 2503(b) (1982).
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 78, required countries to do more
than simply sign the code if they wished to obtain the benefits of American accession
to the code; it also required the president to determine that signatories to the code
"accorded adequate benefits, including substantially equal competitive opportunities
for the commerce of the United States." 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b).
To foreclose the possibility that a "country under the Agreement" could sign the
Agreement or promise to assume similar obligations, and subsequently not honor its
commitments, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 authorized the
U.S. Trade Representative to revoke a country's status as a "country under the
Agreement." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(c) (p.p. 1990).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(2) (1982).
Mexico and Taiwan obtained an injury test from the U.S. under this provision after
bilateral negotiations. See, e.g., Understanding Between the United States and Mex-
ico Regarding Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, April 23, 1985, discussed in
Cementos Anahuac Del Golfo v. U.S., 689 F. Supp. 1191, 1194-95 (CT. INT'L TRADE
1988), and Cementos Guadalajara v. U.S., 686 F. Supp. 335, 341 (CT. INT'L TRADE
1988).
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(3) (1982).
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of an industry in the U.S.) before countervailing duties will be
imposed.82 Goods which originate in countries that are not parties to
the Code or have not assumed similar obligations will be subject to the
old law, which permits the imposition of a countervailing duty without
an injury test.8 3
3. Government Procurement Practices
a. The National Treatment Obligation and Government Purchases
Under the General Agreement
In addition to imposing high tariffs or providing generous subsidies to
domestic producers, governments may also impair free trade by tailor-
ing internal laws and regulations concerning the purchase, sale, trans-
portation, distribution or use of goods to discriminate against foreign
products. Unlike the "customs, duties and charges of any kind" consid-
ered by article I, these laws and regulations become operative after the
imports have cleared customs and applicable tariffs have been paid.84
Article III of the General Agreement establishes the "national treatment
obligation," which requires such internal laws and regulations to treat
other contracting parties' products "no less favourabl[y]" than domestic
products.85
A House Report stated that this provision applied to only seven countries: El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Liberia, Nepal, Paraguay, Venezuela and North Yemen (Sana).
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEAS, TRADE AGREEMENTS AcT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No.
317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1979). These countries are popularly known as "the
seven dwarfs."
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982).
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1). Although inconsistent with article VI of the General
Agreement, the old law was grandfathered under the Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion. See supra note 1. The vast majority of GATT members who are non-signatories
to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code are developing countries. Cf 40
USITC, OPERATIONS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM REP. 38, 39 (1989) (tables list-
ing Code Signatories and Contracting Parties to GATT).
For cases applying these rules, see, e.g., Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Bd. v.
U.S., 669 F. Supp. 445, 448 (CT. INT'L TRADE 1987) (because Canada is a "country
under the Agreement," the Commission was required to determine whether an
industry in the U.S. is materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, by
reason of imports of that merchandise); Hide-Away Creations, Ltd. v. U.S., 584 F.
Supp. 18, 20 (CT. INT'L TRADE 1984) (inasmuch as Mexico is not a "country under
the Agreement," no determination of injury was required in the countervailing duty
investigation); Ambassador Div. of Florsheim Shoe Co. v. U.S., 577 F. Supp. 1016,
1019 (CT. INT'L TRADE 1983), rev'd on other grounds 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed.Cir. 1984)
(because India was not a "country under the agreement," the old law governed);
Industrial Fasteners Group, Am. Importers Ass'n v. U.S., 710 F.2d 1576, 1579 (1983)
(because ITA determined that India was not a "country under the Agreement" on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the countervailing duty investigation was
governed by 19 U.S.C. § 1303).
84. See Government Procurement Code, supra note 4, art. II, para. 2 ("laws, regu-
lations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement [do not
include] customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation, the method of levying such duties and charges, and other import regula-
tions and formalities").
85. GATr, supra note 1, art. III, para. 4, provides,
Comell International Law Journal
The national treatment obligation is a stronger commitment to free
trade principles than the most-favored-nation obligation because it com-
pletely eliminates artificial handicaps imposed on imported goods.86
However, in a significant departure from its free trade underpinnings,
the General Agreement excludes most government procurement regula-
tions from the national treatment obligation.8 7 Government procure-
ment regulations may give domestic goods a stipulated price advantage
over imports. They can also frustrate foreign company efforts to learn
about domestic government bidding opportunities, to participate in the
bidding process, to meet technical specifications carefully designed to
favor domestic products, or to resolve procedural disputes after their
bids are rejected.88 Nations typically justify such regulations as neces-
sary to protect their balance of payments position, preserve national
security, or support local industry.8 9 In most countries, the percentage
of gross national product consumed by government expenditures has
steadily increased; this has magnified the threat posed by government
procurement regulations to the efficient operation of the international
economy.90 Although most government purchases are exempt from the
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall be accorded no less favorable treat-
ment than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use....
See generallyJAcKsoN, supra note 1, at 273-304;JAcKSON & DAvEY, supra note 1, at 483-
537.
86. Unlike article I, where the bench mark for measuring permissible tariff levels
for goods originating in a GATT member state is the lowest tariff given to any coun-
try, the bench mark for the national treatment obligation is the treatment accorded to
domestic products. Thus, while imported goods that enjoy the benefit of the national
treatment obligation will be subject to a tariff, after that tariff is paid they are treated
identically to domestic products.
87. GA-Tr, supra note 1, art. III, para. 8(a), provides that the provisions of article
III "shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement
by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not
with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale."
Occasionally, plaintiffs in American courts have successfully invoked the "commer-
cial purpose" exception to the exclusion of government purchases from the national
treatment obligation in order to invalidate state and local Buy-American laws. In
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Super. Ct., 208 Cal. App.2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798
(1963), the City and County of San Francisco solicited bids for the delivery of tur-
bines, generators, valves, and pipes for the construction of an electric power facility.
The California Buy-American statute required that all applicable components be
manufactured in the U.S. Upon a challenge by a supplier proposing to include for-
eign components in its bid package, the court held that the California legislation was
unenforceable to exclude products from GATT signatories because "the turbines
and other equipment are for use in the generation of electric power for resale and
hence for 'use in the production of goods for sale.' Electricity is a commodity which,
like other goods, can be manufactured, transported and sold." Id. at 819. See JACK-
SON, supra note 1, at 292 n. 14.
88. Baldwin, supra note 63, at 239.
89. DAt, supra note 1, at 199-200.
90. Id.
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national treatment obligation, it is unclear whether the regulations gov-
erning those purchases are nevertheless subject to the unconditional
MFN commitment of article I; this Note will argue that government pro-
curement regulations are subject to unconditional MFN.91
In addition to enacting laws and regulations which require govern-
ment procurement officers to favor domestic products, governments
may also establish or acquire commercial enterprises and require such
enterprises to favor domestic goods in their purchasing practices. 92
While few U.S. government agencies could be considered "state trading
enterprises," many other GAT members have them.93 Article XVII of
the General Agreement, "State Trading Enterprises," requires that
"such enterprises shall, having due regard to other provisions of this
Agreement, make any.., purchases or sales [of imports or exports]
solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price,
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions
of purchase or sale .... ,,94 It is generally accepted that these provisions
establish the equivalent of a most favored nation obligation.95 Since
article XVII by language and drafting intent applies only to state trading
91. See infra notes 161-97 and accompanying text.
92. Examples of such enterprises included companies which have been national-
ized, marketing boards, and import monopolies. See U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION,
REPORT TO COMMITTEE ON FIN. OF U.S. STATES SENATE AND SUBCOMMITrEE ON INT'L
TRADE 52-55 (1974) [hereinafter TARIFF COMMISSION REPORT]. In its "Suggested
Draft Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations," see
infra note 172 and accompanying text, the U.S. included a substantially similar provi-
sion. The State Department described its purpose as follows:
To a greater extent than ever before, governments are participating directly
in foreign trade. Some, like the Soviet Union, have a complete government
monopoly of foreign trade. More often, the government has a monopoly of
trade in a particular product. For instance, the British government intends to
import all the raw cotton needed by the United Kingdom in the future.
France and other European countries have long had monopolies on such
things as tobacco, salt and matches, largely for revenue purposes. A third
form of state trading occurs when the government owns an enterprise which
engages in foreign trade even though it is not a monopoly.
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INFORMAL COMMENTARY TO
ACCOMPANY THE FULL TEXT (OF THE) SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 29 (1946) [hereinafter INFORMAL
COMMENTARY].
93. TARIFF COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 59-65. See supra note 92.
94. GATr, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 1.
95. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 346-47. Concerning the forerunner of article XVII
included in the U.S. "Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of
the United Nations," see infra note 172 and accompanying text, the State Department
noted that,
[A]ll state trading enterprises should conduct themselves along commercial
lines, buying where they can get the best goods most cheaply, selling where
they get the greatest return. They are to give all members most-favored-
nation treatment and not discriminate against the goods of any of them.
Effective application of these principles would remove the danger that state
trading enterprises would act on a political ground and would, in effect, make
market forces determine their operations.
INFORMAL COMMENTARY, supra note 92, at 30.
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enterprise purchases of imports, such purchases are not subject to the
national treatment obligation.96
However, as is the case in article III, article XVII treats purchases
for government use differently than other purchases. Paragraph two of
article XVII requires contracting parties to accord "imports of products
for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not
otherwise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale... fair
and equitable treatment."'97 The meaning of "fair and equitable treat-
ment" is unclear and has never been the subject of detailed explanation.
Several commentators have suggested that it establishes an uncondi-
tional MFN-type of obligation.98
Another area of uncertainty concerning paragraph two of article
XVII is its scope. Does the heading of article XVII, "State Trading
Enterprises," confine the scope of paragraph two to purchases by state
trading enterprises? An early GATT panel decision held that the scope
of paragraph two was limited to matters considered in paragraph one,
i.e., only purchases by state trading enterprises were subject to the "fair
and equitable treatment" standard.9 9 Nevertheless, several commenta-
tors have assumed that paragraph two applies to all government
purchases, regardless of whether the purchasing entity is a state trading
enterprise, and one commentator has suggested that the "fair and equi-
table treatment" standard would apply to procurement by U.S. govern-
ment agencies.10 0 This Note shall assume that artide XVII applies only
96. See GATr, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 1;JACKSON, supra note 1, at 347; text
reproduced in footnote 95.
97. GATr, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 2.
98. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 360 ("it appears to be a looser Most-Favored-Nation
idea"); SENATE FINANCE COMM., 93D CONGRESS, 2D SESS., EXECuTIvE BRANCH GATT
STUDIES 79 (compilation of 1973 studies, prepared by the Executive Branch at the
request of A. Ribicoff, Chairman, Subcommittee in International Trade) (1974)
("This provision is generally regarded as a near substitute for the most-favored-
nation clause"). But see Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 89-90.
99. GATr, B.I.S.D., 1st Supp. 60, para. 4 (1953) (paragraph two "referred only to
the principle set forth in paragraph one of... [article XVII], i.e., the obligation to
make purchases in accordance with commercial considerations and did not extend to
matters dealt with in article III"). Although the issue at hand was whether paragraph
two of article XVII affected the national treatment obligation with respect to internal
taxes addressed in paragraph two of article III, this analysis would probably also
apply to government procurement regulations covered by paragraph four of article
m.
100. Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 89-90. Dr. Hufbauer argued that the "fair and
equitable treatment" standard was not the equivalent of unconditional MFN, and
therefore the post-Tokyo Round discrimination in favor of signatories to the Govern-
ment Procurement Code was not inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Gen-
eral Agreement. Hufbauer commented that "[t]here is nothing inherently equitable
about unilateral access to the public procurement market of another country when a
nation's own public agencies follow a 'buy national' policy." Id. at 90.
Two arguments may be made in response to Hufbauer's suggestion that the U.S.
government procurement law after the Tokyo Round may be justified under article
XVII. First, as suggested above, a strong argument can be made that article XVII
generally does not apply to U.S. government agencies, rendering it unnecessary to
fathom the meaning of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard of article XVII,
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to state trading enterprises, that U.S. government agencies do not fll
within that category, and therefore article XVII is generally inapplicable
to an evaluation of whether the U.S. law of federal government procure-
ment is "GATT-legal." Such a critique must rest on article III.
b. Preferential Treatment of Domestic Suppliers in U.S. Federal
Government Procurement
The Buy American Act of 1933 and accompanying regulations generally
give American products a price advantage over imported goods when a
federal instrumentality acquires goods for "public use."' 0 1 The Act also
provides for the "blacklisting" of public works contractors who use
imported materials without authorization. 10 2 Generally, if the low
American bid is a "small business concern" or "labor surplus area con-
cern," federal procurement officers must add twelve percent to the low-
est foreign goods bid;' 03 in all other cases, six percent is added. °4
c. The Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code and U.S. Law
Under the terms of the Government Procurement Code, internal regula-
paragraph 2. The drafting history of the state trading enterprise article suggests that
it was intended to deal with nationalized industries, marketing boards, import
monopolies and similar institutions illustrative of the "creeping socialism" prevalent
in the late 1940s, and not with primarily regulatory government agencies in the
American model. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text; E. McGovERN, INT'L
TgADE REG. 213 (1986). Therefore, applying article XVII to U.S. government pro-
curement seems inappropriate in most cases.
Second, assuming that article XVII does apply to U.S. government procurement,
there is no basis for concluding that the "looser Most-Favored-Nation idea," JACK-
SON, supra note 1, at 360, encapsulated in the "fair and equitable treatment" standard
of article XVII, paragraph 2 would sanction trade discrimination. Whenever an
unconditional MFN-type of obligation applies, there will always be a fairness issue as
to whether "free riders" can justifiably claim the benefits MFN confers. The fact that
nonsignatories to the government procurement code do not commit themselves to
the elimination of "buy national" policies is no more dispositive of the issue than is
the failure of a GATT signatory to reduce tariffs after a trade round: notwithstanding
a signatory's failure to cut its tariffs, it receives the benefits of tariff reductions made
by all other signatories. In light of the fundamental importance of unconditional
MFN to the GATT system, see supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text, as long as
the "fair and equitable treatment" standard of article XVII remains unexplained by a
GATT panel, there is ample foundation for concluding that unconditional MFN
should apply to state trading enterprise purchases for government use.
101. 41 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 131-32,
919 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 517-18 (1979).
Notice that the Buy American Act applies only to goods purchased for "public use"
19 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982) (For example, a recent Comptroller's General opinion held
that Bureau of Mint metal purchases for use in manufacturing coins on behalf of a
foreign government were not subject to the Buy American Act regulations. 58 Comp.
Gen. 327 (1979)).
Recall that a similar public use limitation appears in the exemption of government
purchases from the national treatment obligation under the General Agreement.
GArr, supra note 1, art. III, para. 8(a).
102. 19 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982).
103. Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 25.105(a)(2) (1988).
104. Id. § 25.105(a)(1).
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tions controlling certain purchases 10 5 by specified government enti-
ties10 6 must treat goods from other Code signatories "no less favorably"
than (1) domestic goods and (2) goods originating in other Code signa-
tories. 10 7 The Government Procurement Code therefore explicitly
extends the national treatment obligation108 and the nondiscrimination
principle' 0 9 to purchases by instrumentalities of Code signatories.
The Government Procurement Code also introduces "trans-
parency" to the procurement process. Detailed provisions regulate the
specification of technical requirements,' 10 the tendering process,' I and
the publication of regulations concerning government procurement
practice and policy; 112 all of these provisions enable foreign goods to
compete with domestic products on a more level playing field.
As is the case with the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Code, 113 the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 enacted the provisions of
the Government Procurement Code on a conditional MFN basis. The
relevant provisions of that Act authorize the President to waive "any law,
regulation, procedure, or practice regarding government procurement"
when applied to the purchase of "eligible goods" from "eligible coun-
tries" and when application of the rule results in treatment "less
favorable" than that accorded U.S. products and suppliers and products
of other eligible countries. 14
For waiver eligibility, the President must determine that the country
is either: (1) a party to the Government Procurement Agreement which
provides appropriate reciprocal competitive government procurement
opportunities to U.S. products and suppliers, or (2) a country, other
than a major industrial country, which will otherwise assume the obliga-
tions of the Agreement and will provide such opportunities to such
products and suppliers, or (3) a country, other than a major industrial
country, which will provide such opportunities to such products and
suppliers, or (4) a least developed country, as defined by the United
Nations. 15
105. The Code applies only to purchases in excess of 150,000 Special Drawing
Rights and does not apply to military purchases. Government Procurement Code,
supra note 4, art. I, para. l(b); id at art. VIII, para. 1. In 1981, the value of the
threshold amount was $196,000; byJan. 1, 1990, it had declined to $172,000. Refer-
ence File: Buy American Rules, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 46:103 (March 28, 1990).
106. The government entities covered by the Code are identified in an annex. The
current list of 54 American agencies covered by the agreement is reproduced at 48
C.F.R. § 25.406 (1988).
107. Government Procurement Code, supra note 4, art. II, para. 1.
108. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
110. Government Procurement Code, supra note 4, art. IV.
111. Id at art. V.
112. Id at art. VI.
113. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
114. 19 U.S.C. § 2511(a) (1982).
115. 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b) (1982). The third category was included to permit flexi-
bility in extending Code benefits to countries which could not, because of deficien-
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In a significant departure from previous Buy American laws, the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 required the President to prohibit
purchases of products covered by the Government Procurement Agree-
ment from countries which did not obtain a waiver under any of the four
routes described above. 1 6 For major industrial countries, this prohibi-
tion took effect immediately after the first waiver of the Buy American
laws became operative, but could be delayed for up to two years for
other countries.' 1 7 The purpose of this provision was "to encourage...
countries to participate in the agreement and to provide reciprocal com-
petitive opportunities to the U.S.."1 8
II. Analysis
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 significantly modified American law
pertaining to countervailing duties and government procurement, but
the modifications apply only to merchandise from countries which have
either signed the related MTN Agreement or assumed equivalent obli-
gations.119 This Note argues that signatories to the General Agreement
who are denied the Act's provisions providing for a material injury to
domestic industry test as a precondition to the imposition of a counter-
vailing duty can challenge that denial, at the GATT level, as a violation
of the unconditional MFN commitment which the U.S. assumed upon
becoming a party to the General Agreement. 12 0 This Note also argues
that members of the GATT who are nonsignatories to the government
procurement MTN agreement may also challenge, at the GATT level,
discriminatory actions by the U.S. under its modified Buy American
law.121 Offering a possible remedy for these violations, article XXIII of
the General Agreement provides that a party injured by the failure of
another party to observe the General Agreement may be authorized by
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to suspend trade concessions it made in favor
of the guilty party. 122
des in their internal procurement policies, adopt Code-equivalent obligations in fill.
Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 86-97.
116. 19 U.S.C. § 2512(a) (1982); Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R.
§ 25.402(c) (1988).
117. 19 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (1982).
118. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 77, at 135; 19 U.S.C. § 2512(a) (1982). Under the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 20, federal agencies
may not award contracts for the procurement of goods produced or manufactured in
(1) a signatory to the Government Procurement Agreement which is "not in good
standing" or (2) a foreign country which maintains "a significant and persistent pat-
tern or practice of discrimination against United States products ... which results in
identifiable harm to United States businesses." Id at § lOb-1. The Act includes an
elaborate definition of "not in good standing" and provides for a system of override
clauses. Id- at § l0b-l(c).
119. See supra notes 78-82, 114-17 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 130-60 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 161-97 and accompanying text.
122. GATr, supra note 1, art. XXIII, provides:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or
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To determine the legality of the Trade Agreements Act's provisions
.under the General Agreement, this Note follows the analytical path pro-
vided for in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a codifica-
tion of customary international legal principles concerning bilateral and
multilateral treaties.125 The Vienna Convention includes special provi-
sions for "successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter."1 24
Between parties to the earlier agreement, only one of whom is also a
party to the later agreement, the provisions of the earlier agreement
control. 125
To determine the legal obligations as between two parties to the
General Agreement, only one of which is a Tokyo Round code signa-
tory, the Vienna Convention suggests the following analytical frame-
work.126 First, ascertain whether the domestic law enacting the Tokyo
Round code concerns subject matter which is included within the uncon-
ditional MFN obligations of the General Agreement. If the subject mat-
ter is so included, the code signatory must offer any concessions it
makes upon accession to the code to any member of GATT, regardless
of whether the offeree is a code signatory. If the unconditional MFN
commitment of the General Agreement does not reach the subject mat-
ter in question, then conditional application of the code under domestic
law is consistent with the General Agreement. Second, if the uncondi-
that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the
result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement ....... the contracting party may... make with
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give
sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it...
[the party may then complain to the CONTRACTING PARTIES]. If the CoN-
TRACT:NG PARTIEs consider that the circumstances are serious enough tojus-
tify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend
the application to any contracting party ... as they determine to be appropri-
ate in the circumstances.
GArr, supra note 1, art. XXIII, paras. 1-2.
123. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. With
respect to the legal significance of the Convention as customary international law,
one commentator has noted,
[b]ecause most of its substantive provisions reflect the International Law
Commission's expert judgment regarding the expectations of permissible
treaty conduct that had been developed, and because a substantial number of
states have reinforced those expectations by signing and then ratifying the
Convention, its substantive provisions have been regarded as authoritative
statements of the law even for nonparties to the Convention.
F. Kirgis, Current International Law 4-5 (unpublished manuscript 1988). See also
WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 88.
124. Vienna Convention, supra note 123, art. 30(1).
125. Id at art. 30, para. 4.
126. This framework is also consistent with the Action by the Contracting Parties
on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 5, which declared that "existing
rights and benefits under the GATT of contracting parties not being parties to these
Agreements, including those derived from article I, are not affected by these
Agreements."
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tional MFN obligation of the General Agreement does encompass the
subject matter of the code, then one must ask whether the party apply-
ing the code conditionally can invoke one of the standard exceptions to
the unconditional MFN.12 7 If such an exception is either unavailable or
unexercised, conditional application would violate the General
Agreement.
Determining whether the General Agreement extends the uncondi-
tional MFN obligation to the imposition of countervailing duties and
government procurement purchases involves the interpretation of
ambiguous language. The Vienna Convention requires such interpreta-
tions to be "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose."1 28 In light of the pivotal role unconditional MFN plays in
furthering the fundamental objectives of the General Agreement, 12 9 a
strong case can be made that ambiguities in the text of the General
Agreement should be read to expand the scope of the unconditional
MFN obligation whenever such a construction is reasonable.
A. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 bifurcated the U.S. law of counter-
vailing duties with respect to dutiable merchandise: some GATT mem-
bers now receive the benefits of a "proof of injury to domestic industry"
requirement, while other GATT members do not.18 0 To evaluate
whether this dual standard violates the General Agreement's uncondi-
tional MFN obligation, it is first necessary to establish whether the Gen-
eral Agreement's unconditional MFN treatment encompasses the
imposition of countervailing duties.' 8 '
The plain language of article I strongly suggests that the drafters of
the General Agreement intended to subject countervailing duty laws to
the unconditional MFN obligation. Article I extends unconditional
MFN treatment to "customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation.., and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges."' l 2 In light of the General Agree-
ment's "object and purpose"'13 3 of preventing discriminatory trade
127. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
128. Vienna Convention, supra note 123, art. 31, para. 1.
129. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
131. An American court considered this issue in connection with a bilateral com-
mercial treaty with Italy. The treaty contained an unconditional MFN clause very
similar to that found in the General Agreement. The court rejected on factual
grounds plaintiff's contention that the U.S. was applying its countervailing duty law
in a discriminatory manner and did not specifically reach the issue of whether coun-
tervailing duties were exempt from unconditional MFN treatment. American
Express Co. v. U.S., 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See also Energetic Worsted
Corp. v. U.S., 224 F. Supp. 606 (Cust. Ct. 3d Div. 1963).
132. GATr, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1, full text reproduced supra note 37.
133. Vienna Convention, supra note 123, art. 31, § 1.
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practices, it is very easy to conclude that the "ordinary meaning"1' 4 of
"customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation ...and with respect to the method of levying such
duties and charges" encompasses the method of levying countervailing
duties and the article VI injury test.
GATT precedent supports the interpretation that article I was
meant to include countervailing duties.1 3 5 In 1967, the GATT Secreta-
riat issued a legal opinion on whether signatories to the 1967 Anti-
Dumping Code15 6 must apply its provisions on an unconditional MFN
basis to nonsignatories. The Director-General held that article I of the
General Agreement entitled nonsignatories to the same treatment with
respect to anti-dumping duties as signatories:
In my judgment the words of Article I-"the method of levying
duties and charges (of any kind)", and "all rules and formalities in conne-
xion with importation"-cover many of the matters dealt with in the Anti-
Dumping Code, such as investigations to determine normal value or
injury and the imposition of anti-dumping duties. In fact, the principle of
non-discrimination in the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports
from different sources is written into the Code itself, in Article 8(b). Fur-
thermore, for a contracting party to apply an improved set of rules for the
interpretation and application of an Article of the GATT only in its trade
with contracting parties which undertake to apply the same rules would
introduce a conditional element into the most-favoured-nation obliga-
tions which, under Article I of GATT, are dearly unconditional.1 37
Both antidumping and countervailing duties are imposed to neutralize
price advantages which certain unfair trade practices confer on the
affected imports. Countervailing duties mitigate the effects of govern-
ment-sponsored subsidy programs, while antidumping duties limit the
ability of multinational firms to strategically price their products so that
excess profits in one country subsidize losses incurred to gain market
share in other countries. In light of the substantial conceptual similarity
between antidumping and countervailing duties, the opportunities for
protectionism which both types of duties present, and the sweeping lan-
guage of article I, there is ample basis to argue that the Director-Gen-
134. Id
135. Professor Jackson wrote, "although there may be no strict doctrine of stare
decisis in international organizations including GATT, it is very clear that previous
practice does have an important influence on the interpretation and application of
the treaty agreement in subsequent fact situations." JACKSON, supra note 1, at 23.
136. Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI, GArr, B.I.S.D. 15th Supp.
74(1968). This was the first attempt to clarify the language of article VI of the Gen-
eral Agreement through the drafting of a formal code. See JAcKSoN, supra note 1, at
410.
137. GArr, Doc. L/3149 (1968). Article 8(b) of the Anti-Dumping Code provides
"[w]hen an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dump-
ing duty shall be levied in the appropriate amounts in each case on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis on imports of such products." Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI,
supra note 136, Art. 8(b). See Hudec, supra note 12, at 192, n.27; JACKSON, supra note
1, at 410-11, n.27.
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eral's analysis should also be applied to the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Code.
Recent experience illustrates the threat the American conditional
MFN approach poses to international relations. Shortly after comple-
tion of the Tokyo Round, the U.S. refused to recognize India's accession
to the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code.138 The U.S. there-
fore proceeded to impose countervailing duties against Indian imports
without the injury test required by the Code. India objected because it
appeared that the U.S. expected less discipline over subsidies practice
from Pakistan, which was providing the U.S. valuable assistance during
the Afghanistan crisis.1 3 9 At India's request, a GATT Panel considered
whether this U.S. action violated its obligation under article I of the
General Agreement to treat Indian imports on an unconditional MFN
basis. 140 Before the Panel reached a decision, the U.S. reached an
agreement with India and treated it as a party to the Agreement.14'
A similar episode, never formally presented to the GATT, con-
cerned a bilateral agreement between New Zealand and the U.S.
designed to restrain New Zealand's export subsidy program. New Zea-
land signed the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code with reser-
vations pertaining to its export subsidies program. Responding to these
reservations, the U.S. accepted New Zealand as a party to the Code only
on condition that New Zealand phase out certain of its export subsidies
by 1985. During 1985, New Zealand trade officials began to lobby the
U.S. for a two-year extension to the subsidy phase-out period, which was
to end April 1, 1985. Unfortunately for New Zealand's trade lobbyists,
its new Prime Minister had just announced that New Zealand would for-
bid the entry of nudear-armed ships into its ports. In response to this
policy, the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Sea Power and Force
Projection Subcommittee introduced a resolution urging no extension
138. The Code did not require Code signatories to recognize the accession of
other parties to the code. See supra note 77. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
supra note 78, provided that in order for a nation to be eligible for the domestic
injury test, not only must it have "accepted the obligations of the agreement with
respect to the United States," 19 U.S.CA. § 2503(b)(2)(A) (1982), but it also "should
not otherwise be denied the benefits of the agreement with respect to the United
States because such country has not accorded adequate benefits, including substan-
tially equivalent opportunities for the commerce of the United States ...... 19
U.S.C.A. § 2503(b)(2)(B) (1982).
139. DEVELOPING CouNRIES, supra note 12, at 88-89.
140. The reference to the GATT was,
[to examine, in light of the relevant GATT provisions, the complaint by
India that the United States action to levy countervailing duties on imports
... without applying injury criteria referred to in paragraph 6 of Article VI,
while extending the benefit of such criteria to imports from some other con-
tracting parties, is not consistent with the obligations of the United States
under GATT, including the provisions of Article I thereof, and that the bene-
fits accruing to India under the General Agreement are being nullified or
impaired thereby ....
Panel on United States Countervailing Duties, Report of the Panel adopted on 3
November 1981 (L/5192), GArr, B.I.S.D., 28th Supp. 113 (1982).
141. Id. See also DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs, supra note 12, at 88-89.
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of the subsidies phase-out deadline and an end to the injury test require-
ment on the original deadline. The Chairman further commented,
"[h]ad New Zealand not adopted its policy regarding port calls, some
would undoubtedly have argued that the U.S., in keeping with its special
relationship with New Zealand, should honor that nation's requests for
additional time and retention of the injury test."1 42 As of April 1, 1985,
the U.S. no longer treated New Zealand as a party to the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Code and New Zealand lost its right to a proof
of injury to domestic industry requirement on countervailing duty com-
plaints brought by American companies.1 43
While neither the India nor the New Zealand episodes led to the
level of political acrimony prevalent during the 1930s, they do illustrate
potential dangers to harmonious operation of the world trading system
should the U.S. be permitted to continue its conditional application of
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. In light of the
"object and purpose" of the General Agreement to promote interna-
tional comity through nondiscriminatory trade practices, the language
of article I should be construed to include the levy of countervailing
duties and the accompanying injury test provided for in article VI.
Some proponents of the current American countervailing duty law
argue that since the imposition of a countervailing duty is an inherently
discriminatory measure144 designed to neutralize the effect of "unfair"
subsidy programs, any country which does not agree to the subsidy limi-
tations of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code "has a weak
claim to the broad benefits of article I" of the General Agreement. 145
These commentators proceed to analyze the American countervailing
duty law under article XX of the General Agreement. Article XX autho-
rizes parties to adopt "measures... necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations . .. including those relating to customs enforce-
ment," so long as such measures are not "arbitrary or unjustifiable."' 146
Therefore, the argument goes, article XX prohibits only those discrimi-
natory practices which are arbitrary or unjustifiable and the U.S. may
discriminate against subsidizing countries because such discrimination is
an appropriate response to unfair subsidies.' 47
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, in light of the weak disci-
plines on subsidies imposed by the General Agreement, it cannot be
claimed that the drafters of the General Agreement considered subsidies
inherently "unfair" trade practices. 148 The GATr continues to recog-
nize the legitimacy of subsidies in appropriate circumstances; the Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures Code itself declares that
142. See 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (Current Reports) (BNA) 228 (Feb. 13, 1985).
143. 50 Fed. Reg. 13,111 (1985).
144. This is true in the sense that only the products of the particular country which
provides subsidies are subject to any given countervailing duty order.
145. Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 74; see also Rubin, supra note 12, at 238.
146. Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 75; GATr, supra note 1, art. XX.
147. Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 75-76; Rubin, supra note 12, at 238.
148. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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"[s]ignatories recognize that subsidies are used by governments to pro-
mote important objectives of social and economic policy."'1 4 9
A second response to arguments justifying conditional MFN appli-
cation of the injury test under article XX is that it seems inappropriate,
on textual grounds, to apply the standard set forth in article XX to coun-
tervailing duties or the accompanying injury test. Article XX governs
"measures ... necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
... including those relating to customs enforcement."' 5 0 Although this
language is ambiguous, its basic thrust is to guarantee signatories the
right to develop procedural rules which enable them to effectively exe-
cute customs laws and reduce the risk that they will be circumvented.
The United States does not legislate for other nations acceptable sub-
sidy practices and seek to enforce such rules through countervailing
duties. Rather, the United States assumes that other nations will subsi-
dize industries and responds through the imposition of countervailing
duties. The countervailing duty law is not a procedural rule which
relates to another substantive aspect of the American tariff; rather, it is
in itself an important substantive component of the American tariff sys-
tem. Furthermore, the injury test is not simply a procedural prerequi-
site to the assessment of a countervailing duty. Its presence or absence
so profoundly affects the importation of subsidized products that it must
be deemed a substantive feature of the American countervailing duty
law. For these reasons, the countervailing duty law and accompanying
injury test appear to fall outside the scope of article XX, and on the
grounds developed earlier, 15 ' are within the scope of article I.
Finally, even if the American countervailing duty law were governed
by article XX, article XX would prohibit discriminatory laws which are
"applied in a manner which would constitute... a disguised restriction
on international trade."'152 Imposing a countervailing duty on a subsidy
which has not demonstrably impaired U.S. industry itself constitutes
unfair protectionism which unduly restricts international trade. This
was certainly the position of America's trading partners at the Tokyo
Round, when they lobbied the U.S. to modify its countervailing duty law
and provide an injury test.153
Assuming that the new U.S. countervailing duty law is subject to the
unconditional MFN obligation, the next step is to ascertain whether the
U.S. may invoke any reservations, exceptions, or escape clauses. The
Senate Finance Committee Report to the Trade Act of 197415
explained that its reasons for suggesting a conditional MFN negotiating
strategy at the Tokyo Round were to guarantee reciprocity and promote
149. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1.
The provision then notes that "[s]ignatories also recognize that subsidies may cause
adverse effects to the interests of other signatories." Id
150. GArr, supra note 1, article XX, para. (d).
151. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
152. GATr, supra note 1, art. XX.
153. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
154. REPORT ON TRADE Acr OF 1974, supra note 7, at 77-78.
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the widest compliance with any substantive obligations which arise as a
result of the round. Aside from arguing that the unconditional MFN
obligation does not encompass countervailing duties, 155 proponents of
the U.S. policy also suggest that conditional MFN application of the
injury test would be "GATT legal" under the Protocol of Provisional
Application exemption.' 56 The Protocol subjects Part II obligations,
which include the article VI injury test, to existing legislation. 15 7 One
commentator has suggested that since the United States did not have an
injury test upon becoming a party to the General Agreement, it "might
argue that grandfather rights in the area of countervailing duties can be
surrendered on a country-by-country basis, without derogating from the
unconditional MFN obligations of article I, paragraph 1."' Under the
analysis developed above, this "protocol defense" would not permit the
U.S. to offer its injury test on a conditional MFN basis. Though the
injury test is a Part II obligation, this Note argues that the obligation not
to discriminate in the assessment of "customs duties and other changes"
is found in article I.159 Article I obligations are not subject to the grand-
father clause of the Protocol of Provisional Application.1 60 Therefore, if
the article I unconditional MFN commitment runs to all matters related
to the assessment of countervailing duties, the U.S. may not offer the
injury test only to selected signatories to the GATT. Once the U.S.
elects to offer the injury test to some GATT signatories, it is committed
to do so for all.
B. The Government Procurement Code
Government Procurement Code signatories must follow a detailed col-
lection of tender notification, bidding, and dispute resolution rules
which are designed to ensure that public and quasi-public agencies offer
equal opportunity to goods originating in other Code signatories.' 6 '
The Code also requires signatories to accord goods from other signato-
ries the benefits of the national treatment and unconditional MFN obli-
gations. 162 Pursuant to U.S. obligations under the Code, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 permits the President to waive Buy American
rules for goods originating in selected GATT member nations. 163
The express language of article III of the General Agreement
excludes most government purchases from the scope of the national
treatment obligation.' 64 The issue considered here is whether routine
155. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
156. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 70, at 45.
157. See supra note 1.
158. Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 77.
159. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 1.
161. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
164. GATr, supra note 1, art. III, para. 8(a). Note that paragraph 8(a) does not
exclude from the national treatment obligation goods purchased "with a view to
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government purchases are nevertheless subject to the unconditional
MFN principle under the General Agreement. Although most commen-
tators state that government purchases are exempt from both obliga-
tions, 16 5 it appears there has never been an actual controversy on
whether a government's purchases are subject to the unconditional
MFN obligation. 166
This Note departs from the accepted view that government
purchases are not subject to unconditional MFN and argues an alterna-
tive based on a close reading of the language and drafting history of
article III and article I: the General Agreement permits internal govern-
ment procurement laws and regulations which generally favor domestic
goods, but prohibits such laws which discriminate between imported
goods by country of origin.
Recall that the unconditional MFN obligation of article I expressly
incorporates "all matters referred to in paragraph... 4 of article III,"
and that paragraph 4 of article III establishes the national treatment
obligation with respect to "all laws, regulations and requirements affect-
ing their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase . . . or use."
16 7
Although the language of paragraph 4 of article III would include gov-
ernment procurement laws and regulations, paragraph 8(a) of article III
provides that "[t]he provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws,
regulations, or requirements governing the procurement by govern-
mental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes."
1 6 8
The issue then is whether paragraph 8(a) of article III, which clearly
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial
sale." Since the Buy American Act of 1933 only encompasses goods purchased by
government agencies for "public use," the provisions of the General Agreement and
American law agree that commercial purchases by government agencies should not
discriminate against foreign goods. See supra note 87.
165. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 145; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 291;
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, at 522; Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 89; Hudec, supra
note 12, at 97 n.26. But see E. McGovERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 213,
§ 6.21 (1986):
National obligations requiring government agencies to favor particular pro-
ducers fll within the terms of Article I:4 of the General Agreement, but the
national treatment standard imposed by that provision is set aside in regard
to government procurement by Article 111:8. From the wording of the Gen-
eral Agreement a strong case can be made for saying that no such exception
is associated with the MFN obligation in Article Il, the terms of which
extend its scope to the matters "refered to" in Article IH:4. Against this it
can be said that Article XVII:2 provides that the nondiscrimination rule in
Article XVH:1 does not apply to procurement and that the applicable stan-
dard is only one of fair and equitable treatment.
166. Before the modifications of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Buy American
statutes and regulations treated GATT-member origin goods equally. See S. REP.
No. 249, supra note 70, at 133; supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. However,
in its study of nontariff trade barriers the Tariff Commission noted that the U.K.
government gives special preferences to Commonwealth countries and European
Free Trade Association members. TARIFF COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 68.
167. GATr, supra note 1, art. HI, para. 4, text also reproduced supra note 85; id art.
1, para. 1, text reproduced supra note 37.
168. Id. at para. 8(a). See supra note 87.
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excuses government purchases from the national treatment obligation,
should also eliminate application of the unconditional MFN obligation
to government purchases.
Arguably, these provisions do not excuse government procurement
regulations from unconditional MFN. This interpretation borrows from
a familiar canon of statutory construction: an interpretation of statutory
language which renders it meaningless should be avoided. Internal laws
and regulations consistent with the national treatment obligation of arti-
cle III will treat foreign goods in the same manner as they treat domestic
goods. Since the bench mark for the national treatment obligation is the
treatment of domestic goods, the treatment of foreign goods which orig-
inate in different countries will be identical. In general, it appears that
the national treatment obligation implies the equivalent of uncondi-
tional MFN treatment. 169 Understanding the relationship between the
national treatment obligation and unconditional MFN in this way, the
language in article I which extends unconditional MFN treatment to
matters referred to in paragraph 4 of Article III appears superfluous at
first blush. Thus, it becomes necessary to develop a construction of this
language which would avoid reading it as surplussage. One such con-
struction, which is also supported by the drafting history, is that the ref-
erence in article I to matters referred to in paragraph 4 of article III was
intended to impose an unconditional MFN requirement on the "laws,
regulations and requirements" which were excluded from the national
treatment obligation by paragraph 8(a) of article III.
A careful analysis of the drafting history of the General Agree-
ment's unconditional MFN and national treatment provisions supports
the conclusion that the drafters intended to subject government pro-
curement purchases which are not already covered by the state trading
enterprise "fair and equitable treatment" standard170 to the uncondi-
tional MFN commitment of article I. At the First Session of the Prepara-
tory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and
Employment,17 ' which took place in London, October 15 through
November 26, 1946, the U.S. submitted its "Suggested Charter for an
International Trade Organization of the United Nations"17 2 [hereinafter
Draft Charter]. The Draft Charter's "General Most-Favored-Nation
169. Except, perhaps, in the highly unlikely circumstance that internal laws and
regulations treat foreign goods more favorably than domestic articles.
170. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
171. See Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. EPCT/83 (1946) [herein-
after London Report]. Technically, the U.S. Draft Charter, infra note 172, the
London Report, id., the New York Draft, infra note 177, and the Geneva Draft, infra
note 183, relate to the formation of the proposed International Trade Organization,
which was to be an agency of the United Nations. However, the preparatory work for
the General Agreement and the ITO Charter were closely intermingled, and the
obvious similarity in the language of the provisions of the respective documents sug-
gests that these UN documents are authoritative sources in the drafting history of the
General Agreement. SeeJAcKSON, supra note 1, at 902.
172. Reproduced in London Report, supra note 171, at 52-67.
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Treatment" article extended unconditional MFN to "all matters relating
to internal taxation or regulation refered to in article 9.1' 173 Article 9 of
the Draft Charter, "National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regu-
lation," provided that:
[t]he products of any Member country imported into any other Member
country shall be ... accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded like products of national origin in respect of all internal laws,
regulations or requirements affecting their sale, transportation or distri-
bution or affecting their mixing, processing, exhibition or other use,
including laws and regulations governing the procurement by governmental agencies
of supplies for public use other than by or for the military establishment. 174
In its first report, the Preparatory Committee recommended revi-
sions to the Draft Charter, including the proposal that "governmental
purchases of supplies for government use" be exempt from the national
treatment obligation. 175 The Preparatory Committee also proposed the
omission of the "commitment regarding governmental purchases of
supplies for governmental use.., from the scope of the most-favored-
nation clause because a suitable clause dealing with such governmental
purchases is recommended for inclusion in article 31 (Non-discrimina-
tory Administration of State-Trading Enterprises)."' 17 6 Since there was
insufficient time to finish a revised Draft Charter before the conclusion
of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, the Committee
formed the "Drafting Committee" to complete the revisions. The Draft-
ing Committee met in New York from January 20 to February 25, 1947,
and produced the "New York Draft."'17 7
The New York Draft clearly effectuated the Preparatory Commit-
tee's desire to eliminate all government procurement from the scope of
the basic unconditional MFN obligation. Article 14 of the New York
Draft, "General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment," extended uncondi-
tional MFN to "all matters for which national treatment is provided for in
article 15."178 Article 15, "National treatment on internal taxation and
regulation," extended the national treatment obligation "in respect of
all laws, regulations or requirements affecting their internal sale, offer-
ing for sale, transportation, distribution or use of any kind whatso-
ever,"1 79 and deleted the reference to "laws and regulations governing
the procurement by government agencies of supplies for public use
other than by or for the military establishment" included in the Ameri-
173. Draft Charter, supra note 172, art. 8, para. 1.
174. Id, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis added).
175. London Report, supra note 171, at chapter III(d)(iv). The Preparatory Com-
mittee thought that any attempts to negotiate for the elimination of "buy national"
laws "would lead to exceptions almost as broad as the commitment itself." Id
176. Id at chapter III(d)(iii). See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text, for a
discussion of the state trading enterprise issue.
177. See U.N. Doc. EPCT/34, at 1 (1947) [hereinafter New York Report]; Id at 3-
52 [hereinafter New York Draft].
178. New York Draft, supra note 177, art. 14., para. 1 (emphasis added).
179. Id at art. 15, para. 3.
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can Draft Charter.' 80 To eliminate any possibility of ambiguity, article
15 of the New York Draft also stipulated that "[t]he provisions of this
Article shall not apply to the procurement by goverment agencies of sup-
plies for governmental use and not for resale (nor in production of
goods for resale)."' 181 In summary, the provisions of the New York
Draft dearly precluded any argument that government purchases were
subject to either the unconditional MFN of article 14 or the national
treatment obligation.
During the months after the release of the New York Draft,' 82 it
appears that the attitude against subjecting government procurement
regulations to the basic unconditional MFN commitment of article 14
shifted. In the Draft Charter included in the report of the Second Ses-
sion of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment [hereinafter Geneva Draft], 183 the New York
Draft language of the articles concerning the unconditional MFN and
national treatment obligations was substantially revised. Article 16 of
the Geneva Draft, "General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment,"
extended unconditional MFN to include "all matters refered to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 18" 184 (the national treatment provisions),
rather than "to all matters in regard to which national treatment is pro-
videdfor in [the national treatment article]."' 185 Article 18 of the Geneva
Draft, "National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation,"
extended the national treatment obligation "in respect of all laws, regu-
lations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use," 18 6 rather than "in respect
of all laws, regulations or requirements affecting their internal sale,
180. Draft Charter, supra note 172, art. 9, para. 1.
181. New York Draft, supra note 177, art. 15, para. 5 (emphasis added).
182. The official UN printed version of the New York Report is dated May 29,
1947. See id at front cover.
183. U.N. Doc. EPCT/186 (1947). The draft charter produced at the Second Ses-
sion of the Preparatory Committee [hereinafter Geneva Draft] is reproduced id. at 7-
58. The report was adopted by the Preparatory Committee on August 22, 1947. Id
at 5.
184. Geneva Draft, supra note 183, art. 16 (emphasis added). Note that this lan-
guage is identical to the corresponding provision in the General Agreement, except
for the different numbering of the articles and paragraphs. GATr, supra note 1, art. I,
para 1.
185. New York Draft, supra note 177, art. 14, para. 1.
186. Geneva Draft, supra note 183, art. 18, para. 2. Note that this language is iden-
tical to the corresponding provision in the General Agreement. GATr, supra note 1,
art. III, para. 4.
The phrase "all laws, regulations and requirements affecting . . .purchase [of
imports]" is broader in scope than "laws and regulations governing the procurement
by governmental agencies of supplies for public use," as recommended by the U.S. in
its Draft Charter, supra note 172. If article 18, paragraph 2 of the Geneva Draft omit-
ted the word "purchase," paragraph 5 of Article 18, see infra note 188 and accompa-
nying text, which creates the exception to the national treatment obligation for
government procurement purchases, would be redundant and no claim could be
made that government purchases were incorporated by reference into the uncondi-
tional MFN obligation of the Geneva Draft's article 16.
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offering for sale, transportation, distribution or use." 18 7 While the
Geneva Draft's article 18 provided that "[t]he provisions of this article
shall not apply to the procurement by governmental agencies of prod-
ucts purchased for governmental purposes and not for resale or use in
the production of goods for sale," 188 a literal reading of this language in
conjunction with the Geneva Draft's article 16 would exempt govern-
ment purchases from the national treatment obligation, not from the
unconditional MFN obligation. Since the New York Draft's provisions
unambiguously exempted government procurement from the scope of
the unconditional MFN obligation,' 8 9 the substantial revisions which
appeared in the Geneva Draft strongly suggest actual intent to subject
government purchases not already covered by the draft's state trading
enterprise article' 90 to the unconditional MFN obligation of article 16.
The language of the Geneva Draft affecting the relationship
between the unconditional MFN obligation and government procure-
ment regulations and the corresponding provisions of the General
Agreement are substantially identical.' 9 1 Therefore, reading the uncon-
ditional MFN language in article I of the General Agreement to include
government procurement regulations is fully consistent with its drafting
history. Such a reading of articles I and III would permit a GATT signa-
tory such as the U.S. to enact government procurement laws and regula-
tions which favor domestic goods, but prohibit it from treating
merchandise originating in different GAIT signatories unequally for
government procurement purposes. Therefore, the provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 authorizing the President to waive the
requirements of the Buy American Act in favor of particular GATT sig-
natories is not "GATT legal" under article I.
Assuming Buy American Act waivers which discriminate between
GATT members violate article I commitments to unconditional MFN,
we must again determine whether the U.S. may claim an exemption
under the Protocol of Provisional Application. In an annex to the Gen-
eral Agreement, the parties stipulated that "[t]he obligations incorpo-
rated in paragraph 1 of article I by reference to paragraphs 2 and 4 of
article III... shall be considered as falling within Part II for the pur-
poses of the Protocol of Provisional Application."' 192 Recall that under
the terms of the Protocol, Part II obligations are accepted only to the
extent "not inconsistent with existing legislation."' 9 3 Since the Buy
American Act was such existing legislation, the U.S. could claim certain
"grandfather privileges."' 194
187. New York Draft, supra note 177, art. 15, para. 3.
188. Geneva Draft, supra note 183, art. 18, para. 5.
189. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
190. Geneva Draft, supra note 183, art. 30.
191. See supra notes 167-68, 184-88 and accompanying text.
192. GATr, supra note 1, annex I, art. I, para. 1.
193. See supra note I and accompanying text.
194. In 1955, the GATT Secretariat took an inventory of laws and regulations
inconsistent with obligations under the General Agreement but retained under the
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It appears, however, that as of October 30, 1947, the original Buy
American laws and regulations did not offer special treatment to particu-
lar foreign suppliers. 195 Therefore, a Protocol defense would not
render the Presidential authority to selectively waive application of the
Buy American rules "GATT legal." This conclusion also applies to the
provisions in the 1979 and 1988 trade bills which completely blacklist
selected GAT signatories from eligibility as suppliers to certain federal
agencies. 196 The blacklist extends far beyond the scope of the original
Buy American rules, which only gave domestic manufacturers a price
preference and did not purport to completely ban particular countries
from bidding on U.S. government contracts. 197
Thus, U.S. government purchases are subject to the unconditional
MFN obligation, and a "Protocol" defense is unavailable to permit dis-
criminatory practices. Therefore, it appears that the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 authorizes action inconsistent with U.S. obligations under
the General Agreement.
Conclusion
This Note has argued that the conditional MFN approach adopted by
the U.S. with respect to two of the MTN Agreements, the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Code and the Government Procurement
Code, is not "GATT legal." The analysis presented in this Note is
admittedly legalistic, of interest to those GATT members (primarily the
developing world) who believe that the GATT system should be gov-
erned by "rule-oriented diplomacy," as distinguished from "power-ori-
ented diplomacy."' 98 It does not purport to address the more
fundamental question of whether unconditional MFN should be
replaced by conditional MFN in the GATT system's efforts to deal with
nontariff trade barriers. These policy questions are best answered by
economists and experienced trade negotiators.' 99
Protocol of Provisional Application's grandfather clause. The U.S. did not report any
Buy American laws or regulations in that inventory, and therefore it arguably waived
such rights. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 1, 301, n.22, 306.
195. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 70, at 131-33; supra note 166 and accompany-
ing text. In light of the ambiguity in articles I and III concerning whether govern-
ment purchases are subject to unconditional MFN, the fact that the U.S. did not claim
any grandfather privileges with respect to the Buy American Act supports this con-
dusion. See supra note 194.
196. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 101-4 and accompanying text.
198. See WORLD TRADING SYsTEM, supra note 1, at 85-88.
199. See, e.g., Hufbauer, supra note 12, at 51 ("unconditional MFN cannot play the
lead role in trade negotiations because, if scrupulously followed, the principle would
inhibit trade liberalization... unconditional MFN can usefully play the role of good
housekeeper. From time to time, it should be used to clean up the attic of trade
policy."); GArr Focus, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 3 ("The GAIT economists consider
essential a return to the most-favored-nation system ... "); Hudec, supra note 12;
Snape, supra note 12.
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Whatever the merits of retaining unconditional MFN obligations in
future trade negotiations, most of the major industrial countries, includ-
ing the European Community, Japan, and Canada, acceded to both
MTN Agreements discussed in this Note.200 As U.S. law accords those
signatories the full benefits of the Codes, it appears that the principal
victims of its discriminatory trade practices are developing countries.
It has been observed that the need to protect domestic manufactur-
ers from foreign competition "constituted the chief theoretical or intel-
lectual basis for the American tariff during the 19th century and the
early part of the 20th.' 2° 1 It is therefore ironic that the U.S. today
imposes the equivalent of a penalty on third world countries which
attempt to use nontariff barriers to further the same objective which the
U.S. formerly realized through high tariffs. Whatever the merits of
American conditional MFN policy from a trade negotiator's perspective,
it is dearly inconsistent with a 50-year tradition of furthering the inter-
ests of international free trade through vigorous application and sup-
port for the unconditional MFN principle.
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200. 40 USITC, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT PROGRAM REP. 39 (1989).
201. D. SNIDER, supra note 25, at 211.
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